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AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL C REER DECISIONS, 1947-1986 
D. RODERICK KIEWIET California Institute of Technology 
LANGCHE ZENG University of Oregon 
Mt Frost previous research on congressional career decisions has focused on one of two binary 
choices-between retiring and running for reelection, or between running for reelection 
and seeking higher office. But most of the time, representatives face all three choices 
simultaneously. Employing a "mother logit" model, we estimate the effects of relevant variables both 
on pairwise comparisons (conditional probabilities) and on the unconditional probabilities of choosing 
each one of these three alternatives. Probably most intriguing is our finding that a member's age has 
little or no effect upon the unconditional probability of running for reelection. The interrelatedness of
career options is seen particularly clearly in the case of incumbents who had been redistricted out of 
their seats. When they had an opportunity to run for higher office, they were likely to take it. Only 
when they lacked such an opportunity were they more likely than other members to opt for retirement. 
R esearch on congressional career decisions has 
largely followed two separate and independent 
paths. The first concerns the decisions of mem- 
bers of the House of Representatives either to run for 
reelection or to retire. Many of these studies have 
sought to explain major shifts in retirement rates over 
time-the upsurge in retirements that occurred dur- 
ing the 1970s (Cooper and West 1981; Frantzich 1978; 
Hibbing 1982), their subsequent decline in the 1980s 
(Moore and Hibbing 1991), and the jump of retire- 
ment rates to record levels in 1992 (Groseclose and 
Krehbiel 1993; Jacobson and Dimock 1993). A second 
major area of inquiry focuses on the decision of 
House incumbents either to run for reelection or to 
abandon their seats in order to seek higher office- 
typically governor or U.S. senator. Adopting the 
terminology of Schlesinger's (1966) classic study, the 
latter choice is referred to as progressive ambition. In 
seeking to explain voluntary departure from the 
House, most previous studies of congressional career 
decisions have thus treated these decisions as simple 
binary choices: (1) retire or not and (2) seek higher 
office or not. 
Most of the time, however, congressmen actually 
face all three choices-run for reelection, retire, or 
run for higher office-simultaneously. To examine 
retirements separately or progressive ambition sepa- 
rately artificially truncates the actual menu of choices 
that incumbents confront. This point is more than a 
conceptual or semantic one. Assume, for example, 
that a particular member has tired of service in the 
House. With an incumbent of his own party running 
for reelection in both the gubernatorial and senatorial 
races in his state, he decides to go back home and 
practice law. But what if the senate race were instead 
for an open seat? If he decided to abandon his House 
seat for a try at the Senate, that representative would 
be excluded from an analysis of voluntary retire- 
ments, because he chose neither to retire nor to run 
for reelection. Yet at least in this example, the mem- 
ber was as disenchanted of the House as any other 
retiree. Furthermore, when we see that at a particular 
point in time a member chooses to retire, we also 
know that they have not on some previous occasion 
decided to seek higher office-and vice versa.1 
More precisely, previous studies of voluntary re- 
tirement were analyzing the conditional probability 
of members choosing retirement over seeking reelec- 
tion, given that they had not otherwise chosen to run 
for higher office. Similarly, studies of progressive 
ambition were analyzing the conditional probability 
of seeking higher office versus remaining in the 
House, given that the member had not otherwise 
chosen to retire. We learn how a representative 
chooses from a subset of all possible alternatives but 
nothing about how the subset was chosen. One 
major consequence of not simultaneously examining 
all possible alternatives is a failure to specify relevant 
variables that enter the choice calculation. For exam- 
ple, previous studies of voluntary retirement have 
not considered the impact of key variables that affect 
progressive ambition, such as the desirability of an- 
other office and the likelihood of obtaining it. True, 
these variables probably do not affect the conditional 
probability of retiring versus seeking reelection. If 
they increase the probability of House members seek- 
ing higher office, however, they necessarily decrease 
the probability of members choosing the choice sub- 
set of {retire, reelection} and thus necessarily decrease 
the probability of retiring. 
We shall formulate an integrated model of congres- 
sional career decisions, a model based upon the 
assumption of expected utility maximization. After a 
discussion of our estimation strategy, we review the 
two strands of research identified previously-pro- 
gressive ambition and voluntary retirement-in order 
to identify key variables needed to enter into our 
model. The data used in our analysis are the career 
decisions made by incumbents serving in the House 
from the Eightieth through the Ninety-ninth Con- 
gresses (1947-86). Following the lead of previous 
research, we first estimate the effect of key variables 
upon each pairwise comparison of choices. However, 
we then calculate the effect of each significant inde- 
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pendent variable upon the unconditional probability of 
choosing each of the three alternatives run for reelec- 
tion, seek higher office, or retire. Our intention here is to 
draw as complete a picture as possible of how House 
members choose among their career alternatives. An 
important contribution of this analysis is the informa- 
tion it reveals about those who choose to stay in the 
House. Over the past several years, the percentage of 
incumbents defeated in their reelection bids has usu- 
ally been quite low (see Figure 1). To understand the 
composition of the House and turnover in its mem- 
bership, it has thus become particularly important to 
understand why and when incumbents choose to 
leave the House voluntarily. 
AN EXPECTED-UTILITY ANALYSIS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL CAREER DECISIONS 
We assume that representatives are rational in the 
sense of maximizing expected utility. Consider the 
choices that House incumbents face at the end of each 
term. Those who have an opportunity to run for a 
higher office have the choice set i = {al, a2, a3}, where 
a, = retire, a2 = run for reelection to the House, and 
a3 = run for a higher office. Those who do not have 
an opportunity for higher office choose between a, 
and a2. Rohde (1979) considers a House member to 
have such an opportunity if an election is being held 
in the member's state for a Senate seat or for the 
governorship and there is no own-party incumbent 
seeking reelection to the office in question. Given that 
House members virtually never challenge an incum- 
bent governor or senator of their own party, this 
would appear to be an appropriate way to proceed. 
Under the rationality assumption, a representative 
chooses option a- if and only if the expected utility of 
a is greater than that of all other available options. 
The representative who chooses to retire receives the 
utility of retirement U1 with certainty, that is, proba- 
bility Q1 = 1. The representative who chooses to run 
for reelection wins reelection with probability Q2, 
receiving utility from the House seat U2, minus the 
cost of running for reelection C2 and, correspond- 
ingly, loses with probability 1 - Q2, receiving U1 - 
C2. The representative who chooses to run for higher 
office wins with probability Q3, receiving utility from 
the higher office seat U3 minus the cost of running for 
it C3, and loses with probability 1 - Q3, receiving 
U1 - C3. Let Ej denote the expected utility of choosing 
option aj. Hence we have 
El= U1 
E2 = Q2U2 + (1-Q2)Ul-C2 
= Ul+Q2(U2- Ul)-C2 
E3 = Q3U3 + (1-Q3)U1-C3 
= Ul + Q(U3 - U() - C31) 
A graphical illustration of the choice situation pre- 
sented in equation 1 is shown in Figure 2. 
Sources of House Membership Turnover 
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As any affine transformation of an expected utility 
function is also an expected utility function (Varian 
1984), we can subtract U1 from all Ej and rewrite 
equation 1 as 
El = 0 
E2= Q2(U2- Ul1)-C2 
E3= Q3(U3-U1)-C3. (2) 
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Congressional Career Choices 
The Congressman 
Run for Run for 
Retire Reelection Higher Office 
Q,~ Q2/ \Q2 Q3 \- Q3 i 
U1 U2-C2 Ul -C2 U3 - C3 U-QC3 
El = U1 
E2= Ul + Q2 (U2- Ul)- C2 
E3=Ul+Q3(UL3-UI)- C3l 
Equation 2 states that expected utility of running for 
reelection depends upon the probability of winning 
reelection, the cost of seeking reelection, and the 
value of a House seat relative to the value of retire- 
ment. Similarly, the expected utility of seeking higher 
office depends upon the probability of winning the 
higher office, the cost of seeking it, and the value of 
the higher office relative to the value of retirement. 
If we knew the values of the Eis (i.e. the expected 
utilities associated with each choice), we could pre- 
dict with certainty which one each representative 
would choose. Unfortunately, their exact values are 
functions of many variables, which are only partially 
observable or measurable. The model we estimate 
thus necessarily includes error, and predictions of 
choice can be made only in probabilistic terms. Our 
next task is thus to select a choice model giving the 
probabilities of choosing to retire, running for reelec- 
tion, or seeking higher office, based upon the empir- 
ical expected utilities of the alternatives. 
To avoid making strong assumptions about the 
nature of the errors in the Es, we adopt what has 
come to be called the mother logit model (McFadden 
1975). As formulated by Train (1986), let Pi, = f (zin; 
zjn, a ;? i; sn) be the "true" probability that decision 
maker n chooses alternative i, where zin is the ob- 
served data relating to alternative i faced by decision 
maker n, zjn is the observed data relating to alterna- 
tives other than i, and sn is a vector of characteristics 
associated with the decision maker. This model im- 
poses no restrictions on the functional form of f. All 
choice models are special cases of this model, includ- 
ing the standard logit and probit models. 
Now define Win = log Pi*, and evaluate the logit 
probabilities based on Win: 
ewin e1og PI 
Pin- e 'jD d eog Pa n* 
where the last equality is due to the fact that choice 
probabilities necessarily sum to 1. Equation 3 shows 
that any choice probability PAin can be expressed in the 
logit probability form.2 The next question to consider 
is the appropriate specification of W1.3 Once we 
obtain Wi, we can straightforwardly estimate a logit- 
form model. Because Win = log P depends on the 
(expected) utilities of all alternatives, all variables 
that enter the utility function of any alternative enter 
each Win. For members facing different choice sets 
(i.e., with or without the option of seeking higher 
office), different sets of variables and coefficients may 
enter Wi. For those whose choice set does encompass 
all three alternatives, the expected utility function of 
equation 2 gives us 
Wi = gI(U1, U2, U3, Q2, Q3, C2, C3). 
Let X denote the vector of variables that appear in 
gi and assume, for simplicity, that gis are linear, then 
Wi = fjX where pi is a vector of coefficients. The 
choice probabilities are therefore given by 
Pi= 
= 
x* (4) 
If the choice set contains two alternatives, then U3, 
Q3, and C3 do not enter Wi. Denoting the rest of the 
variables by Y and again assuming linearity, we have 
Wi = ajiY, where aji is a vector of coefficients. The 
choice probabilities are therefore given by 
eaiY 
Pi= 
x= 
a- (5) 
.~= 1 e i 
Equation 4 can be rewritten as 
e(,01 - }32)X 
= e(al - ,2)X + 1 + e03- p2)X 
or 
= 1 + e(P2- Pl)X + e(P3 - P1)X 
P2 and P3 (and the probabilities in equation 5) can 
be expressed similarly. If the first alternative is taken 
as the base of normalization, estimation of the model 
will give f2 - f1 and p3 - f1. We correspondingly 
estimate f1 - 12 and 83 - 12 if the second alternative 
is taken as the base of normalization and 1 - 83 and 
182 - 83 if the third alternative is the base. Normaliz- 
ing utilities using different bases can facilitate the 
interpretation of estimation results. 
In the case of individuals with only two choices 
available, it is easy to verify that 
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aPt 
dY = PlP2(al - a2). 
The variables are signed by a1 - a2. Hence we can 
infer the direction of the effect upon P1 of an inde- 
pendent variable y directly from the sign of the 
estimated coefficient of y. If there are three alterna- 
tives, then 
ePlX = ePlX 2 1 ePiX 
= j3iePjx j=1 =eIXasiePX 
where the second fraction is the probability of choos- 
ing the subset {1, 2} and the first fraction is the 
conditional probability of choosing alternative 1 over 
alternative 2 given that the subset {1, 2} is chosen. 
This conditional probability has the same functional 
form as the unconditional probability in the binary 
choice case, and similar analysis shows that its partial 
derivatives are signed by (f31 - 12). 
FACTORS INFLUENCING 
CONGRESSIONAL CAREER DECISIONS 
In order to analyze congressional career decisions 
within the framework of the model just developed, 
we need to identify variables that enter the vector X 
(i.e., that affect the expected utility of competing 
career choices). The probability term associated with 
the retirement option Q1 is of course always 1, and 
this option entails no costs in selecting it. The variable 
most frequently associated with U1-the value of 
retirement-is the member's age. Without exception, 
previous studies in this area observe a positive rela- 
tionship between age and rates of retirement. Al- 
though members who retire from Congress do not 
necessarily exit the labor force entirely, it is quite to 
be expected that advancing years induce members to 
give up a job that is physically, mentally, and emo- 
tionally demanding. True, we could also view age as 
decreasing U2, the value of remaining in the House. 
Whatever the case, age should act to lower the utility 
of continuing to serve in the House relative to that of 
retirement. 
Turning next to U2, perhaps the first variable that 
comes to mind is the salary that members are paid. 
Hibbing (1982) reports some evidence that increases 
in congressional salaries are associated with a decline 
in the number of retirements, and the wide variation 
in salary levels among different state legislatures 
clearly accounts for much of the variation in the 
degree of careerism present in the membership 
(Squire 1988). Unfortunately, in the U.S. Congress 
salary levels are the same for all members serving at 
the same time, change only infrequently, and as 
Hibbing observes are only one component of the total 
compensation package. Moreover, the relevant finan- 
cial calculation incumbents need to make is not salary 
alone but rather the difference between their congres- 
sional salary and what can be earned on the outside 
in the form of wages or pensions or both. For these 
reasons, we think it best to focus on other, nonfinan- 
cial measures. 
It is also probable that some members derive more 
utility from serving in the House than do others, as 
power and influence in the House are not uniformly 
distributed. Most previous studies use members' 
seniority rankings as an indicator of their place in the 
House hierarchy, the hypothesis being that more 
senior members of the House are more powerful and 
thus less inclined to leave voluntarily. Unfortunately, 
seniority is highly correlated with age, which is 
hypothesized to have precisely the opposite effect 
upon retirement decisions. Another major problem 
with this variable is that what counts in Congress is 
not seniority rank on the floor but rather one's place 
in party or committee. In our view, then, it is those 
members who are chairmen of a standing committee 
or who hold a high rank in the party apparatus (i.e., 
Speaker, majority leader, or whip) who would be 
expected to place greater value on serving in the 
House and so be less likely to retire or to run for 
higher office. 
A characteristic that many studies have identified 
as a major source of job dissatisfaction in the House is 
minority party status, which, since World War II, has 
almost always meant being a Republican. Earlier 
studies focused on party differences in voluntary 
retirement rates and report evidence of higher rates 
among House Republicans (Bullock 1972; Frantzich 
1978). More recently, Gilmour and Rothstein (1993) 
and Schansberg (1992) stress that Republicans differ 
from Democrats in their greater propensity to seek 
higher office. The explanation given for these find- 
ings is that minority status implies meager influence 
upon policymaking and virtually no prospect of a 
committee or subcommittee chair. 
A related hypothesis is that House conservatives, 
presumably due to ideological frustration, exhibit 
higher rates of voluntary departure. Frantzich (1978) 
reports some evidence for this in his analysis of 
congressional retirements between 1966 and 1974, 
but by not controlling for party membership, he may 
have only identified a greater propensity toward 
retirement of House Republicans. Hibbing (1982) ex- 
amines this hypothesis by investigating whether or 
not Southern Democrats or those with high Conser- 
vative Coalition scores were more likely to decide to 
retire.5 His results are generally supportive, but co- 
efficient estimates vary a good deal from equation to 
equation. A potential problem with the hypotheses 
that minority party status and conservative ideologi- 
cal tendencies are a source of dissatisfaction is that of 
rational expectations. In other words, Republican 
candidates for the House must surely know that their 
party is unlikely to command a majority. Other 
conservative candidates for the House surely know 
that if elected, they are not going to be in the 
ideological mainstream of the House or even of their 
party. It is thus not obvious that they should subse- 
quently find minority party status or ideological dis- 
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tinctiveness to be a source of frustration or job dis- 
satisfaction. 
Previous research also suggests that important po- 
litical changes inside and outside of the House arena 
have turned what used to be a pleasant, rewarding 
experience into what one observer describes as the 
"awful empty life of a congressman" (Barnes 1988). 
There are many more votes (often on trivial matters), 
longer sessions, and increased committee work load. 
Keeping the job, moreover, requires more trips back 
and forth between Washington and the district, far 
more expensive campaigns, and coping with nasty, 
hard-to-please single-issue groups. Establishing ex- 
actly when the Golden Age of Congress ended is 
problematic, but most scholars point to the early 
1970s, with the Subcommittee Bill of Rights, the 
revolt against the chairmen, and the general assault 
on the seniority norm seen as watershed events. To 
be sure, the fact that these reforms were adopted 
necessarily means that most House members at the 
time preferred them to the previous regime. Even if 
they were generally popular, however, the reforms 
could still have induced higher rates of voluntary 
departure among the minority of members who were 
injured by them. And even members who favored 
the reforms may have found that they made the 
option of leaving the House more attractive by reduc- 
ing the payoffs members receive from continued 
service-by increasing the value of a subcommittee 
chairmanship vis-a-vis a committee chairmanship, for 
example. 
Whatever the case, during the 1970s dozens of 
retiring representatives expressed varying degrees of 
resentment against these reforms, leading congres- 
sional scholars to conclude that these changes were 
largely responsible for the surge in voluntary retire- 
ments that took place at this time (Cooper and West 
1981; Hibbing 1982). Similarly, Brace's (1984) probit 
analysis of progressive ambition indicates that House 
incumbents were more likely to abandon their seats 
and seek higher office after the advent of these 
reforms. In the equation he estimates, he tests this 
hypothesis by specifying a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 for individuals serving in the 
Ninety-first and subsequent Congresses. A problem 
with this operationalization is that members elected 
to the House subsequent to the reforms presumably 
knew what they were in for, and their career deci- 
sions should therefore not be influenced by institu- 
tional changes that occurred prior to their arrival on 
Capitol Hill. Consistent with this reasoning is the fact 
that in the 1980s, the rate of voluntary retirements 
again declined, returning to the low levels that had 
been observed in the 1960s (Moore and Hibbing 
1991). It is preferable, then, to posit that the effects 
of the House reforms should be confined to those 
members elected to the House prior to their imple- 
mentation. 
The next term we need to consider is Q2, the 
probability that an incumbent will be successful in 
seeking reelection to the House. Previous researchers 
have hypothesized that members choose to leave 
voluntarily rather than take on another campaign 
entailing an unacceptably low prospect for success 
(Bullock 1972; Frantzich 1978). This is of course pre- 
cisely what our model predicts, but the two measures 
that have typically been used to test this hypothesis- 
margin of victory in the previous election and a 
dummy variable indicating that a member's district 
had been altered due to redistricting-are not with- 
out problems. As Mann (1978) and Jacobson (1987) 
point out, over the past few decades a member's 
margin in the previous election has become a far- 
from-reliable predictor of performance in the next 
election. Bauer and Hibbing (1989) argue that Jacob- 
son's key finding (i.e., a larger number of incumbents 
with previously safe electoral margins nonetheless 
losing the next election) is primarily due to a larger 
number of them being damaged by redistricting and 
by scandal (including Watergate). Even if an incum- 
bent's margin of victory in the previous election is a 
reliable guide to future electoral prospects, however, 
this does not mean it is an important factor in their 
career decisions. 
Cooper and West (1981), similarly, note that redis- 
tricting more often than not increases rather than 
decreases the electoral security of incumbents, and 
even when it is injurious the amount of damage may 
be inconsequential. Still, there are plenty of instances 
in which it is unambiguously clear that an incum- 
bent's prospects for reelection have been substan- 
tially damaged by redistricting. This occurs when 
large portions of two or more districts are combined 
into one new district, or when a member's district is 
abolished completely. In such cases a member can 
win reelection only by running against and defeat- 
ing another incumbent-a far more formidable task 
than defeating the weak, underfinanced challengers 
incumbents typically run against. Because of the 
abolition of at-large congressional districts and the 
constraints imposed by the Supreme Court's "one- 
person, one-vote" rulings, incumbents have become 
considerably more vulnerable in the redistricting 
process. While 18 and 21 incumbents lost their dis- 
tricts in the Eighty-Second and Eighty-Seventh Con- 
gresses, respectively, in the Ninety-Second and Nine- 
ty-Seventh Congresses the corresponding totals were 
53 and 30. 
Besides being redistricted out of a seat, another 
serious blow that an incumbent representative can 
suffer is to be caught up in a scandal. Without 
question, serious charges of severe misconduct have 
led to the resignation or retirement of dozens of 
representatives over the years. Previous research 
indicates that fairly stringent criteria should be used 
in identifying House incumbents who are tainted by 
scandal. Peters and Welch (1980) show that lesser 
accusations (e.g., violations of campaign finance reg- 
ulations, conflicts of interest, or cronyism in hiring) 
have little impact on vote totals, so that most incum- 
bents who are targets of such charges have no diffi- 
culty winning reelection. We would thus confine our 
attention to House incumbents who have either been 
criminally indicted, or who have been charged with 
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acts of ethical or sexual misconduct that are serious 
enough to capture national attention. By this defini- 
tion, the total count of scandals in our data is 58. 
A variable that might seem to be a straightforward 
measure of C2, the cost of running for reelection, is 
the amount of money representatives expend in their 
reelection bids. The problem is that most of what 
congressional candidates spend is other people's 
money, so that the real costs that candidates face are 
those of inducing individuals and organizations to 
contribute to them, as well as any political or ethical 
problems that flow from accepting these contribu- 
tions. There is also a endogeneity problem, in that the 
amount of money candidates raise and spend de- 
pends upon how badly they want to keep the job. 
Indeed, we only observe expenditures made by can- 
didates who have decided that the cost of running for 
reelection is low enough (and the value of the office is 
high enough) to warrant the effort. This latter prob- 
lem might be finessed by lagging the campaign 
expenditures variable, but unfortunately previous 
expenditures are not all that good an indicator of 
current campaign expenditures. These same prob- 
lems, of course, apply to campaign expenditures as a 
measure of the cost of seeking higher office. 
The next term in the X vector to consider is U3, the 
value of higher office, which, with a few exceptions, 
is either a governorship or a seat in the U.S. Senate. 
In this case, of course, the previous research that we 
have to draw upon comes primarily out of the litera- 
ture on progressive ambition. Rohde (1979), first of 
all, finds that House members are much more likely 
to seek a seat in the Senate than a governorship. He 
attributes this (correctly, we think) to the fact that 
senators serve longer terms than governors and are 
more likely to win reelection. 
As in the literature on voluntary retirement, much 
attention here has also been focused upon the impor- 
tance of age. As Schlesinger puts it, "A man can fail 
to advance in politics as much because he is the 
wrong age at the wrong time as because he is in the 
wrong office" (1966, 174). Schlesinger reports that 
between 1900 and 1958, most members elected to the 
House for the first time were in their late thirties. 
Most governors took office for the first time while in 
their late forties, and most senators in their early 
fifties-considerably younger, in other words, than 
the age at which most members typically retire from 
the House. The implication of these findings is that 
the option of abandoning one's seat in the House for 
a chance at higher office would seem to be more 
attractive for the relatively young. Hain hypothesizes 
explicitly that "the older a politician is . . . the less 
likely he is to harbor ambitions to advance" (1974, 
265). 
Exactly how age enters potentially ambitious 
House members' utility calculations has never been 
well specified. Schlesinger suggests that those who 
enter politics at an early age are politically more 
ambitious, which is another way of saying that the 
increase in utility between their current office and the 
office they aspire to is especially large. In our view, a 
more plausible hypothesis regarding age is offered by 
Rohde (1979). He argues that younger members have 
typically served fewer terms than older members and 
are thus more inclined to seek a Senate seat or 
governorship because they have less to give up by 
way of power and seniority. In his probit analysis of 
progressive ambition among House members, Brace 
(1984) posits age to have a "curvilinear" effect, with 
both relatively young and relatively old members 
being less likely to pursue higher office. Because of 
the high degree of correlation between the age and 
age2 terms needed to specify this effect, we think it is 
preferable to entertain the simpler hypothesis that 
increasing age, contrary to the role it plays in encour- 
aging retirement, discourages House members from 
seeking higher office. 
Previous studies of progressive ambition have been 
most thorough in analyzing Q3, the probability of 
winning election to higher office. First, both Rohde 
(1979) and Brace (1984) find that House members are 
far more likely to run for an open seat than against an 
incumbent governor or senator of the opposing 
party. Both consider the prospect of challenging an 
incumbent senator or governor of one's own party as 
so uninviting that for all practical purposes it is no 
opportunity at all. That House members are more 
attracted to opportunities than entail a greater chance 
of success is further borne out by their finding that 
members from small states exhibit higher rates of 
progressive ambition than those from larger states. In 
the view of Rohde and Brace, this is due to the greater 
degree of commonality between their House district 
and the entire state. Rohde found this effect to be 
especially pronounced in states with just one or two 
congressional districts. We would add that large-state 
members contemplating a run for higher office con- 
front a larger potential pool of formidable candi- 
dates-other House members like themselves. While 
the likelihood is high that a few will run anyway, 
many more will be discouraged. 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Before estimating our mother logit model of congres- 
sional career decisions, we need to detail exactly how 
the variables discussed are operationalized and, 
where useful, briefly to reiterate our expectations as 
to their effects on congressional career decisions. 
(1) Age should increase the probability of retirement 
to the extent that increasing age lowers the 
utility of remaining in office relative to that of 
retirement. We hypothesize age to be negatively 
associated with progressive ambition, primarily 
because younger House members have lower 
opportunity costs. 
(2) Leadership osition is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if the member is the chair of a 
standing committee or a majority party leader 
(Speaker, majority leader, or whip). 
(3) Minority party status is a dummy variable that 
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takes on the value of 1 for Republican members, 
0 otherwise. 
(4) Ideological location in the party caucus, calculated 
separately for Democrats and Republicans, is 
their percentile rank on an underlying liberal- 
conservative dimension derived by scaling roll- 
call votes with Poole and Rosenthal's (1985) 
NOMINATE procedure. Higher percentile rank- 
ings reflect greater conservatism. 
(5) House reforms is a dummy variable intended to 
reflect the institutional and political changes that 
have been hypothesized to decrease the value of 
a seat in the House. It takes on a value of 1 for 
individuals serving in the Ninety-first and four 
subsequent Congresses (1969-78) but only if they 
had been initially elected prior to the Ninety- 
First Congress. 
(6) Previous vote is the percentage of the total vote 
the member won in the previous general elec- 
tion. 
(7) Redistricting is a dummy variable registering the 
fact that a member's district had been combined 
with another district or had been abolished com- 
pletely, with the consequence that the member 
must defeat another incumbent to be reelected. 
(8) Scandal is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if House members have been crimi- 
nally indicted or charged with acts of ethical or 
sexual misconduct serious enough or interesting 
enough to have warranted coverage in the New 
York Times. 
Variables 1 through 5 are intended to be, in one 
way or another, measures of how much utility or 
disutility members derive from their current position 
in the House. Variables 6 through 8 are indicators of 
the probability with which members succeed in being 
reelected. 
Four more measures are of the expected benefits of 
seeking a Senate seat or governorship. 
(9) Senate is a dummy variable reflecting the greater 
attractiveness of a Senate seat in comparison to a 
governorship. It takes on a value of 1 if the 
member has an opportunity to run for the Sen- 
ate, 0 if the only opportunity available is for a 
governorship. 
(10) District-to-state ratio is the log of the reciprocal of 
the number of congressional districts in the 
member's state. We take the log in order to 
capture the declining marginal impact of addi- 
tional districts identified by Rohde. 
(11) Open Senate seat is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if there is an open Senate seat, 
0 otherwise. 
(12) Open governorship is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if the incumbent governor is 
not seeking reelection, 0 otherwise. 
An exploratory overview of these variables is pro- 
vided in Table 1, which reports mean values for 
members who have decided to retire, run for reelec- 
tion, or seek higher office. These data derive from the 
Mean Values of Factors Affecting Congressional 
Career Decisions: A Comparison of Members 
Retiring, Running for Reelection, or Seeking 
Higher Office 
RETIR- REELEC- HIGHER 
VARIABLE ING TION OFFICE 
Age 59.6 51.4 46.6 
Republican .47 .41 .50 
Chair/Leader .09 .05 .01 
Relative conservatism 
Democrat .61 .50 .43 
Republican .54 .50 .49 
Institutional reform .21 .13 .16 
Previous margin .71 .70 .67 
Scandal .03 .01 .00 
Redistricting .03 .01 .04 
Senate election .31 .32 .76 
District-to-state-ratio .11 .12 .27 
Open seat 
Senate .11 .10 .35 
Governor .31 .30 .43 
N 386 7,730 237 
choices made by incumbent members of the House of 
Representatives serving in the Eightieth through 
Ninety-Ninth Congresses. Following the coding 
scheme developed by Loomis (1991), those who re- 
signed or who left the House at the end of a Congress 
and either quit politics or took a demonstrably lesser 
political position (e.g., small town mayor, city council 
member, small town judge, member of the state 
legislature, appointee to a lesser federal or state 
position) were considered to have retired.6 As indi- 
cated earlier, the only higher offices we consider are 
Senate seats and governorships. A few members left 
to seek an office that was arguably superior to a 
House seat, such as president or vice-president, 
mayor of a large city, state attorney general, or state 
supreme court justice. The number of such cases is 
far too small to permit systematic analysis of them, so 
we simply excluded them. The only others cases we 
excluded were instances in which a member was 
expelled from the House, appointed to another office, 
or died in office. Finally, because the model we 
subsequently estimate requires that the alternatives 
under consideration be mutually exclusive, we adopt 
the decision of previous studies not to consider 
odd-year races for governor, since members need not 
surrender their House seats to compete in them. 
The entries in this table are consistent with a 
number of the hypotheses discussed. Those depart- 
ing to seek higher office are on average much 
younger than retirees, and in fact are a good deal 
younger than the average House member seeking 
reelection. In keeping with the findings of Gilmour 
and Rothstein (1993) and Schansberg (1992), we see 
that nearly half of those voluntarily leaving the 
House are Republicans, compared to a little more 
than 40% of the incumbents running for reelection 
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during this period. Also in line with their findings is 
the fact that Republicans appear to be even more 
overrepresented in the ranks of those seeking higher 
office than among retirees. The fact that retirees are 
much more likely than average to be a committee 
chair or party leader is no doubt a function of their 
age. Virtually no one gave up such a position to run 
for higher office. Mean values of the ideological 
rankings indicate that liberal Democrats are more 
inclined to seek higher office but that conservative 
Democrats exhibit a greater propensity to retire. In 
contrast, ideological position in the party caucus 
appears not to matter in the career decisions of House 
Republicans. Hibbing's (1982) findings are also sup- 
ported by our data in that incumbent representatives 
who lived through the reforms of the early 1970s 
exhibit a greater propensity to retire-and, perhaps, a 
greater propensity to seek higher office as well. 
Table 1 shows that the typical House incumbent 
won the previous election by a very large margin. The 
size of this margin, however, appears to have little 
bearing on a representative's career decisions. Being 
redistricted out of a seat is a rare occurrence, but 
those who fall victim to this outrageous fate are more 
likely to retire or seek higher office. Not all voluntary 
departures, it would seem, are all that voluntary. 
Being the object of a scandal is also associated with a 
greater propensity to retire, but we observe no in- 
stance in which a scandal-plagued incumbent aban- 
doned his seat in the House in order to run for higher 
office. The entries concerning the opportunity-for- 
higher-office variables are all consistent with previous 
research. Incumbent House members find the pros- 
pect of being a senator more attractive than that of 
being a governor. Members of the House also seem to 
be able to discern a good shot at a Senate seat or 
governorship when they see one. Those from smaller 
states are considerably more likely to make a run for 
higher office, and running for an open seat is a much 
more attractive prospect than running against an 
incumbent of the other party. 
The findings in Table 1, of course, are suggestive at 
best. A real test of our career decision model and the 
various hypotheses flowing from it requires estima- 
tion of the logit model outlined previously. As noted, 
many members do not have an opportunity to run for 
higher office, which we deem to exist only if an 
election is being held in the member's state for a 
Senate seat or for the governorship and an incumbent 
of the member's same party is not seeking reelection 
to the office in question. For this reason, we estimate 
separate models for those individuals having all three 
choices and for those whose choices are confined to 
retire or run for reelection. The two-choice model 
omits the three dummies that reflect the nature of the 
opportunities for higher office, which necessarily take 
on the value of zero for all members of this class. 
Keep in mind that for members without an opportu- 
nity for higher office, the estimated coefficients reflect 
the impact of the independent variables on the un- 
conditional probability of choosing one option over 
the other. For the large majority of members who do 
have the option to run for higher office, the estimates 
refer to the conditional probability of choosing one 
option over the other, given that the third option was 
not chosen. For the sake of brevity and readability we 
do not repeatedly refer to this fact in our discussion of 
the analysis. 
Results of the logit estimation for members with all 
three choices and for those with only two are re- 
ported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Turning first to 
Table 2, each pair of columns reports the coefficients 
and standard errors for each possible pairwise choice: 
.31 - I32' retire versus run for reelection; f33 - t82, seek 
higher office versus run for reelection; and 33 - 81, seek 
higher office versus retire. Note again that all indepen- 
dent variables are specified for each alternative. As 
indicated earlier, the number of House incumbents 
who ran for higher office in the face of a serious 
scandal was zero. As a result, the estimated variances 
explode, and for that reason we do not report coeffi- 
cients for the scandal variable where the choice of 
seeking higher office is available. 
We see from column 1 that when it comes to 
choosing between seeking reelection and retiring, 
most of the results echo the differences in mean 
values reported in Table 1 and thus tend to support 
Hibbing's (1982) hypotheses concerning voluntary 
retirement. Increasing age encourages members to 
retire, as does being involved in a serious scandal. 
The figures in Table 2 also indicate that House Re- 
publicans, conservative Democrats (so much for the 
rational expectations hypothesis), and members who 
experienced the institutional reforms of the 1970s 
were more likely to favor retirement over running for 
reelection. To the extent that the lower chamber 
serves as a farm club for the upper, the stronger 
tendency of liberal Democrats to run for the Senate 
(and to win) may contribute to what Poole and 
Rosenthal (1984) describe as the ideological polariza- 
tion of the U.S. Senate. 
The more remarkable findings in this column; 
however, may be the null findings-that is, the 
findings where effects associated with the variables 
are too small to reject the hypothesis that they are 
actually zero. Despite the problems that a low margin 
of victory in the previous election might portend for 
future electoral prospects, it appears that this does 
not generally persuade incumbent congressmen to go 
gently into that good night. Neither, surprisingly, 
does losing one's seat to redistricting. Nor does there 
appear to be any relationship between the possession 
of a committee chair or party leadership position and 
the conditional probability of retiring. The -.15 coef- 
ficient is in the expected direction but statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.7 
This last finding suggests to us that for most 
members, a seat in the House is in itself so valuable 
that any increase in utility derived from a committee 
or party leadership position is in an area of their 
utility function where marginal returns are rapidly 
diminishing. This naturally calls into question the 
argument that Republicans are more likely to leave 
the House (either by retiring or by running for higher 
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Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 
1947-1986: Members With an Opportunity for 
Higher Office 
SEEK 
HIGHER SEEK 
RETIRE VS. OFFICE VS. HIGHER 
RUN FOR RUN FOR OFFICE 
REELEC- REELEC- VS. 
VARIABLE TIONa TIONb RETIREC 
Constant -8.52** 1.20 9.73** 
(.81) (.67) (1.04) 
Age 0.77** -.04** -.12** 
(.007) (.008) (.01) 
Republican .89** -.49 -1.38** 
(.32) (.28) (.42) 
Chair/leader -.15 -.87 -.72 
(.28) (.73) (.78) 
Relative conservatism 
Democrat 1.40** - 1.23** -2.63** 
(.39) (.39) (.55) 
Republican .05 .18 .12 
(.35) (.35) (.49) 
Institutional 
reform .37* .42* .05 
(.18) (.20) (.26) 
Previous margin -.01 -.001 (.008) 
(.005) (.004) (.007) 
Scandal 2.05** 
(.44) 
Redistricting .16 1.75** 1.59* 
(.53) (.38) (.63) 
District-to-state -.11 .94** 1.05** 
ratio (.09) (.095) (.12) 
Senate election -.11 1.10** 1.21** 
(.17) (.20) (.26) 
Open Seat 
Senate .21 .82** .61* 
(.20) (.16) (.26) 
Governor - .18 .35* .53* 
(.15) (.15) (.21) 
Note: Only members with an opportunity for higher office are included. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Initial log-likelihood is -5,407.4; 
at convergence, -1,573.4. N = 4,922. 
a.1 
_ 
p2 
_ (2. 
cf3 - f3 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .01 level. 
office) because they are frozen out of leadership 
positions. Perhaps it is also the case that the rewards 
of holding such positions, especially for older mem- 
bers, must be weighed against the costs of a heavier- 
than-normal work load and set of responsibilities. 
Presumably, an aging member could always choose 
to resign a committee chair while remaining in the 
House (a sort of chairman emeritus), but we are 
aware of no one who has done so voluntarily. What- 
ever the case, this finding runs contrary to the pop- 
ular image of geriatric committee chairmen hanging 
around, long into their dotage, to retain their coveted 
prize as long as possible. Perhaps congressional ob- 
servers have fallen prey to something of a perceptual 
bias. Because it takes many terms of service in the 
House to advance up the seniority ladder and become 
chairman of a committee, most committee chairmen 
,re pretty old. But this does not mean that most old 
members are chairmen. And once age, party, and 
several other factors are taken into account, posses- 
sion of a committee or party leadership position does 
not appear to encourage members to put off retire- 
ment any longer than they would have otherwise.8 
Turning to the coefficients in column 2 showing 
effects on the choice between running for reelection 
versus seeking higher office, we see that Rohde's 
findings concerning the structure of opportunities for 
higher office are strongly supported. Members from 
smaller states are considerably more likely to make a 
run for higher office. Running for an open seat is a 
much more attractive prospect for House members 
than running against an incumbent governor or Sen- 
ator of the other party, and the large size of the 
Senate election dummy also coincides with Rohde's 
finding that members of the House are much more 
likely to be attracted by a shot at the Senate than by a 
governorship. Although members who are redis- 
tricted out of their seats appear no more likely to 
choose retirement, they are more likely to seek higher 
office.9 Older members are relatively less likely to 
seek a Senate seat or governorship, while liberal 
Democrats and those who were in office during the 
reforms of the early 1970s are more likely. The sign of 
the coefficient associated with the chair/leader 
dummy is consistent with the hypothesis that House 
leaders are less likely to seek higher office, but the 
coefficient does not achieve conventional levels of 
statistical significance. 
These findings are thus broadly consistent with the 
patterns observed in Table 1 and in previous re- 
search. This is not true of our findings concerning 
House Republicans. Our estimates indicate that they 
were no more likely than Democratic members to 
seek higher office rather than run for reelection. (The 
negative sign of the coefficient is actually in the 
opposite direction of that predicted.) This is contrary 
to what Gilmour and Rothstein (1993) observe, 
namely, that the higher rate of Republican departures 
from the House is almost entirely due to greater 
progressive ambition. One possible reason for this 
discrepancy is that our analysis extends much farther 
back into time than theirs. Specifically, our data series 
includes a period (the late 1940s and early 1950s) 
when the Republicans actually controlled the House 
for a couple of Congresses and so had not yet been 
relegated to "permanent minority" status. We there- 
fore modified the Republican party dummy variable 
to take on the value of 1 only after the 1958 election, 
figuring that it was about then that the Republicans 
began abandoning all realistic hope of retaking the 
House in the foreseeable future. This change moved 
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the estimated coefficient in the predicted (positive 
direction), but only by a small amount. 
We therefore think that the major reason for the 
difference between our findings and those of Gilmour 
and Rothstein is due not to differences in our data 
series but rather to the fact that we control for a broad 
range of other variables in which there are differences 
between Republican and Democratic House mem- 
bers. First, it should be remembered that the zero- 
order comparisons in Table 1, which are based upon 
our entire data series but do not control for these 
other factors, echo their finding of greater progres- 
sive ambition among Republicans. We also find that 
during the period of our study Republicans were 
about 10% less likely than Democrats to be blocked by 
an incumbent governor or senator of their own party. 
Republican members also tended to come from states 
with smaller congressional delegations and were 
somewhat more likely to be redistricted out of their 
seat. All these factors would predispose Republicans 
to higher rates of progressive ambition. We think that 
age differences also worked in this direction, but 
here, the difference in data sets does matter. Al- 
though there is no discernible difference between the 
average age of Republican and Democratic members 
in our data series, during the time frame of Gilmour 
and Rothstein's study Republicans were nearly two 
years younger on average than Democrats. 
As indicated earlier, studies of congressional career 
decisions typically focus on one of two binary choic- 
es-retire versus run for reelection or seek higher office 
versus run for reelection. In an analysis of "congres- 
sional quits," Schansberg (1992) examines the third 
possible choice pair, retire versus seek higher office. Our 
analysis of the conditional probability of choosing to 
seek higher office versus retire is reported in Table 2, 
column 3. The coefficients and standard errors were 
obtained by estimating the model with the first alter- 
native, retirement, as the base of normalization. It 
can be seen that each coefficient here necessarily 
equals the coefficient in column 2 minus the corre- 
sponding coefficient in column 1. We see here that 
the probability of choosing to retire rather than seek 
higher office was dramatically higher for older mem- 
bers, for Republicans, and for conservative Demo- 
crats. In contrast, favorable values on the opportunity 
variables (district-to-state ratio, Senate election, and 
the two open-seat variables) predisposed members to 
make the opposite choice. 
A possibility that occurred to us while undertaking 
this analysis was that congressional career decisions 
might be modeled more accurately by a tree struc- 
ture. In our introduction, we described the hypothet- 
ical situation of a member who, having decided to 
leave the House, was choosing between running for 
the Senate or getting out of politics entirely. Alterna- 
tively, members may first decide whether to run for 
higher office or not and if not, then decide whether to 
seek reelection or to retire. If decisions follow such a 
tree structure (i.e., one prior choice followed by a 
choice between two "similar" alternatives), then a 
model that specifically allows for correlation between 
Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 1947- 
1986: Members With No Opportunity for Higher 
Office (Retire vs. Run for Reelection) 
COEFFICIENT 
VARIABLE (cr1 - Ca2) S.E. 
Constant -9.01** .89 
Age .07** .01 
Republican 1.01 ** .39 
Chair/leader - .23 .29 
Relative conservatism 
Democrat 1.54** .43 
Republican .40 .44 
Institutional reform .21 .21 
Previous margin -.001 -.01 
Scandal 1.90** .61 
Redistricting 1.54** .44 
District-to-state-ratio - .01 .1 
Note: Only members with no opportunity for higher office are included. 
Choice is between retiring and running for reelection. Initial log- 
likelihood is -2,378.2, at convergence, -607.3. N = 3,431. 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .01 level. 
the error terms of the two alternatives (e.g., a nested 
logit model) may be appropriate. We estimated such 
models but found that the similarity parameters were 
outside of the admissible range for proper probability 
choice models. 
The results of our logit analysis for House members 
whose career choices were confined to either running 
for reelection or retiring are reported in Table 3. For 
the most part, the coefficients reported here are 
indistinguishable from the coefficients in the corre- 
sponding I81 - 132 column in Table 2.10 There is one 
crucial exception, namely, the case of the redistricting 
variable. In contrast to the tiny .16 coefficient in Table 
2, the 1.54 coefficient reported here is quite large and 
statistically significant. We see, then, that House 
incumbents who have been redistricted out of their 
seats are far more likely than other House members 
to seek higher office when that option is available but 
no more likely to retire. Retirement is chosen with a 
much higher probability than usual, however, when 
the opportunity to seek higher office does not exist. 
In our view, this finding illustrates better than per- 
haps any other the importance of analyzing all con- 
gressional career options simultaneously. 
CALCULATION OF UNCONDITIONAL 
CHOICE PROBABILITIES 
Although some of the findings reported in Table 2 are 
new, the analysis reported there does not take us 
much beyond previous research on voluntary retire- 
ment and on progressive ambition. As in prior stud- 
ies, the coefficients register only the effect of the 
independent variables upon conditional choice prob- 
abilities in the various pairwise comparisons. As we 
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have argued, however, a deeper understanding of 
congressional career decisions requires us to go be- 
yond the separate consideration of binary choices. 
The real value of the logit analyses we have under- 
taken is that the results allow us to estimate effects of 
key variables upon the unconditional probability of 
selecting among the three options retire, run for reelec- 
tion, and seek higher office. To do this, we need to 
compute the elasticities of the choice probabilities. 
This is the percentage change in the probability of 
selecting a particular choice (holding other variables 
constant), given a percentage change in an indepen- 
dent variable-that is, 
a log P 3p x 
dlogP 3xP 
For dummy variables, we need to calculate the per- 
centage change in choice probabilities with respect to 
the change from 0 to 1, holding other variables 
constant. The average effects on choice probabilities 
of all independent variables with statistically signifi- 
cant coefficients in Table 2 are reported in Table 4. 
(These were computed only for members with all 
three choices available.) 
Note that proper interpretation of the elasticities 
requires taking into account the typical probabilities 
associated with each choice and the range of the 
independent variables. For example, the 3.89 elastic- 
ity of P3 with respect to a change in the redistricting 
dummy from 0 to 1 implies a 389% increase in the 
probability of seeking higher office, say from a typical 
value of 3% to over 14%. In contrast, the -.15 
elasticity of P2 with respect to the same variable 
implies that being redistricted out of their seat de- 
creases the probability of incumbents running for 
reelection from perhaps 92% down to 78%. 
Table 4, row 1 (pertaining to the age variable) 
clearly illustrates the difference this makes in the 
nature of the inferences we draw from the data on 
congressional career decisions. Recall from Table 2 
that the younger the members, the higher the condi- 
tional probability that they choose to run for reelec- 
tion versus retire. But this does not mean that they 
have a significantly higher unconditional probability of 
remaining in the House. As we also know from Table 
2, younger members were also more likely to aban- 
don the House in order to seek higher office. The 
resultant elasticity of P2 (choosing to run for reelec- 
tion) with respect to age of -.09 implies that a 20% 
increase in a member's age (e.g., from 50 to 60) 
lowers their probability of seeking reelection by a 
negligible 1.8% (e.g., from 94% to 92.3%). Given the 
strong effect of age upon the conditional probability 
of retiring, voters in congressional elections might be 
persuaded to vote for younger candidates in the 
belief that they would have a greater likelihood of 
eventually becoming a party or committee leader. 
That age has little effect upon the unconditional 
probability of choosing to run for reelection, how- 
ever, implies that it makes little sense for voters to 
practice this sort of age discrimination. 
Effects of Key Independent Variables Upon 
Unconditional Choice Probabilities 
RETIR- REELEC- HIGHER 
VARIABLE ING TION OFFICE 
Age 3.70 -.09 -2.52 
Republican 1.37 -.04 -.04 
Relative conservatism (D) .51 -.01 -.36 
Institutional reform .40 -.04 .45 
Scandal 5.12 -.20 -.20 
Redistricting .01 -.15 3.89 
District-to-state ratio -.04 -.04 .88 
Senate election -.05 -.05 2.54 
Open seat 
Senate -.06 -.06 1.11 
Governor - .01 - .01 .39 
Note: For the age, relative conservatism, and district-to-state ratio vari- 
ables, the entry reported in this table is the percentage change in the 
unconditional probability of selecting a particular choice (holding other 
variables constant) given a percentage change in the independent 
variable. For the rest of the variables, which are all dummies, the entry 
is the percentage change in the unconditional probability of selecting a 
particular choice with respect to the change from zero to one in the 
independent variable. N = 4,922. 
The effects of a member's ideological position in the 
Democratic Caucus operate in a similar manner. As 
indicated in Table 2, conservative Democrats are 
more likely than liberal Democrats (all other things 
constant) to choose to retire rather than run for 
reelection. But because liberal Democrats are more 
likely to run for higher office, the effect of ideological 
position upon the unconditional probability of run- 
ning for reelection is practically zero. 
As it turns out, the only variables that do have a 
dramatic (negative) effect on the unconditional prob- 
ability of choosing to run for reelection are the scan- 
dal and redistricting variables. While redistricting 
dramatically increases the probability of choosing to 
seek higher office, the major impact of scandal is to 
make retirement a much more attractive option. The 
figures in Table 4 also confirm that Republicans differ 
from Democrats primarily in their greater propensity 
to choose retirement, and are only slightly less likely 
to run for either reelection or higher office. Continu- 
ing down the table, we see that favorable values of 
the variables registering the nature of the opportuni- 
ties for higher office obviously exert a strong impact 
upon P3. Interestingly, the effects of the variables 
reflecting the nature of available opportunities for 
higher office, though small, are virtually identical for 
P1 and P2. We saw in Table 2 that these opportunity 
variables did not affect the conditional probability of 
choosing to retire versus running for reelection to the 
House. It is hard to see why they should. To the 
extent that such variables increase the probability of 
House members seeking higher office, however, they 
necessarily decrease the probability of choosing the 
subset of {retire, reelection} and thus necessarily de- 
crease the probability of retiring. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many of the results produced in our analysis support 
those of previous researchers. In the case of the 
choice between retiring and running for reelection, 
for example, we find clear support for Hibbing's 
(1982) hypotheses about the greater likelihood of 
conservative Democrats, Republicans, and members 
who had experienced the reforms of the early 1970s to 
choose retirement. We also find consistent support 
for Rohde's (1979) hypotheses about the effect of the 
opportunity structure confronting House incumbents 
upon their probability of choosing to run for higher 
office, rather than for reelection to the House. How- 
ever, our results, especially those concerning the 
unconditional probability of members choosing either 
to run for reelection, seek higher office, or retire, shed 
some new light onto the nature of congressional 
career decisions. Notably, we find that knowing the 
age of a member of the House tells you virtually 
nothing about the likelihood that he or she will run 
for reelection, that formal committee and party lead- 
ership positions and previous vote margins do not 
appear to figure into House members' career deci- 
sions, and that House Republicans exhibit no higher 
a level of progressive ambition than do Democrats. 
Finally, the interrelatedness of congressional career 
options is seen particularly clearly in the decisions 
made by those incumbents who had the dubious 
distinction of being redistricted out of their seats. 
When they had an opportunity to run for higher 
office, they were inclined to take it. Only when they 
lacked such an opportunity were they more likely 
than other members to opt for retirement. 
We would like to conclude with a number of 
observations concerning the implications of our find- 
ings and to point to what we think are some poten- 
tially fruitful avenues for future research. The first 
issue we would raise is an econometric one. In our 
data, individual members are sampled every Con- 
gress in which they serve in the House. It is therefore 
likely that some degree of autocorrelation in the 
errors of the expected utility functions is present. The 
fact that the cross-sectional sample size is far larger 
than the number of repetitions (the data set includes 
nearly two thousand different individuals, who on 
average serve only about five terms) probably serves 
to alleviate this problem but does not eliminate it. We 
expect that the performance of the model would be 
improved if information about the error structure 
were explicitly incorporated. Developing a theoreti- 
cally sound model that does this and that remains 
computationally feasible is a high priority for future 
research. 
As indicated earlier, in an era in which very few 
incumbents stumble at the polls, it is the joint effects 
of progressive ambition and voluntary retirement 
that largely determine the composition of the House 
of Representatives. In understanding the impact of 
these career decisions upon the nature of the House 
membership, it should also be realized that the effects 
of these decisions are cumulative. Figure 3 illustrates 
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the impact that differential patterns of voluntary 
departure have had upon the seniority structure of 
the House. In the ranks of the most senior House 
members-the careerists, as Bullock calls them- 
Republicans and members from small states are few 
and far between. What difference does this make? 
Plenty, we think. Even in the House of today, more 
senior members are more effective legislators. They 
enjoy higher rank on committee, have more legisla- 
tive experience, more policy expertise, more "chits" 
collected from past bargains made with fellow legis- 
lators, and more and better contacts in the executive 
branch and in the agencies. Districts in small states or 
those that have elected a Republican are more likely 
to be represented by a relatively junior incumbent, 
lacking, to some degree, in both experience and 
connections. 
Finally, it is probably incumbent upon us to say 
something about the record number of voluntary 
departures from the House in 1992. There is at least 
one new wrinkle present. As Moore and Hibbing 
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(1991) observe, 1992 was the last year that incum- 
bents could convert leftover campaign funds into 
cash; according to their figures, 13 of the incumbents 
announcing their retirement this year had in excess of 
two hundred thousand dollars of convertible cam- 
paign funds. Groseclose and Krehbiel (1993) confirm 
that this "golden parachute" induced a large number 
of retirements. The factors identified in our model, 
however, account fairly well for the 1992 surge in 
retirement. Although not all of them were serious 
enough to satisfy our definition of a scandal, the furor 
involving their overdrafts at the House bank un- 
doubtedly encouraged several other members to opt 
out (Jacobson and Dimock 1993). Nineteen Ninety- 
Two also followed a decennial census year, so the 
number of "voluntary" departures was boosted even 
more by the inevitable casualties of redistricting. 
Indeed, Katz cites redistricting as the "single biggest 
reason that more members are retiring now than in 
previous years (1992, 851). Finally, we agree with 
Cover (1983) that it is best not to make too much of 
sudden shifts in the number of members voluntarily 
departing the House. What goes down must eventu- 
ally come back up. After a number of Congresses 
with lower-than-usual amounts of turnover, the re- 
sultant increase in the "fleet age" of the membership 
necessarily portends a higher-than-usual number of 
retirements somewhere down the line. The last three 
Congresses, of course, had witnessed quite low num- 
bers of both voluntary departures and defeats. 
Notes 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 
annual meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Associa- 
tion, Chicago. We would like to thank Keith Poole, Michael 
Loomis, and Jonathan Katz for their generous assistance and 
Paul Brace, John Gilmour, David Grether, John Hibbing, 
Morgan Kousser, Forrest D. Nelson, Peter Ordeshook, Paul 
Rothstein, Tom Palfrey, and Tom Schwartz for their com- 
ments and criticisms. 
1. It should be noted that there have recently appeared a 
couple of studies that look at both voluntary retirement and 
progressive ambition, instead of only one or the other (Gil- 
mour and Rothstein 1993; Schansberg 1992). 
2. Note that the mother logit model is very general. In 
contrast, the standard logit model with a probability expres- 
sion like equation 3 assumes that the underlying (expected) 
utility for alternative i is Win + eine where fin is the stochastic 
part of the total utility following a type 1 extreme value 
distribution and that the decision maker acts so as to maxi- 
mize his or her expected utility. In practical terms, the major 
difference between a standard logit model and a mother logit 
model thus lies in the interpretation and specification of Win. 
In a logit model, it is the expected utility of alternative i to 
individual n and need not depend on attributes not related to 
alternative i. In a mother logit model, however, Win = log Pisn 
generally depends not only on observed data relating to 
alternative i but also on data relating to all other alternatives. 
The mother logit model, therefore, need not exhibit the 
independence-from-irrelevant alternatives property, in con- 
trast to the standard logit model (Train 1986, 22). 
We should note, however, that the desirable generality of 
the mother logit model is accompanied by difficulty in opera- 
tionalizing the Wins. Lacking information about the functional 
forms of the true probabilities, functional forms of Wins are 
basically unknown and are subject to arbitrary assumptions. 
In this study, for example, we assume that they are linear in 
parameters in order to simplify computation. The correctness 
of the model depends, to a large extent, on the correctness of 
this assumption. We should point out that similar problems 
also exist in the standard logit model. There we know that 
Wins are utilities, but in practice we rarely know the functional 
form of these utility functions. As here, linearity is usually 
assumed without much substantive justification. 
3. For notational simplicity, we hereafter drop the sub- 
script n in Win. 
4. See n. 2. 
5. For many years it appeared to congressional scholars 
that retirement rates were particularly low among southern 
Democrats. Bullock (1972) shows that from 1941 through 1970 
the percentage of southern Democrats who were "careerists" 
(present for 10 or more terms) was considerably higher than 
the percentage among northern Democrats. According to 
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), however, this difference be- 
tween northerners and southerners was entirely due to the 
election of 1946, in which large numbers of northern Demo- 
crats were defeated but very few southerners. They appear to 
regard this finding as a startling new discovery, but it turns 
out that Wolfinger and Heifitz Hollinger (1970) made the same 
observation many years ago. 
6. After obtaining Loomis's data on career decisions, we 
checked it against other data provided to us by Jonathan Katz 
and by Keith Poole. We resolved any discrepancies, which 
turned out to be very few in number, by consulting relevant 
issues of the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Congres- 
sional Quarterly Almanac, and the Biographical Directory of the 
United States Congress. 
7. We also investigated the possibility that a simple 
dummy for committee chairs is too crude a measure, primarily 
because it ignores the varying expectations that members 
might have regarding the prospects of their eventually attain- 
ing a chairmanship. We therefore created a variable for each 
House Democrat which, on the basis of life-expectancy tables, 
registered the probability that they would outlive all other 
higher-ranking Democrats on their committee. In the case of 
members with more than one committee assignment, the 
highest probability was used. When this variable was substi- 
tuted for the chair/leader dummy in the equations we esti- 
mated, the coefficients remained small and insignificant. 
8. One possible explanation for this finding that occurred 
to us was that chairmen or party leaders might hold on to 
their positions until they died in office and thus exit the 
sample without ever retiring. We found, however, that death 
rates were no higher for committee chairmen and party 
leaders than for ordinary members. 
9. The redistricting variable may be subject to a bit of 
endogeneity, in that those drawing the lines may have less 
compunction about eliminating the district of an incumbent 
House member if it is known in advance that that member is 
planning to retire or to run for higher office. When asked how 
the state would be redistricted after losing three seats in in the 
1960 round of reapportionment, Stephen McCann, Demo- 
cratic floor leader in the Pennsylvania House, answered, 
"Show me three congressmen who are willing to give up their 
seats" (Cooke and Keefe 1962, 150). McCann was unfortu- 
nately unable to find three such members. Since the court 
rulings of the 1960s, of course, the constraint that districts 
must contain virtually identical numbers of people makes it 
more difficult to protect all incumbents in a state or portion of 
a state that has lost population since the last census. 
10. The similarities between a, - a2 and fl1 - 2 prompted 
us to estimate a model with pooled samples. This model was 
indistinguishable from the current model in terms of good- 
ness-of-fit criteria. 
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